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ABSTRACT

This article opens up mediation to systematic economic analysis by considering mediators
as analogous.to the Walrasian auctioneers of exchange theory. By altering trade-off rates among
bargaining issues, mediators facilitate a process leading towards Pareto efficient voluntary
settlements.
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1.

Introduction
Mediation is a fonn of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that uses a neutral third-party

to help resolve disputes, but mediators generally do not make binding decisions. As such,
mediators are effective only in as much as they can facilitate a voluntary settlement among the
disputants. This contrasts with arbitrators, for example, who dictate binding settlements.
Mediation is utilized worldwide in a wide variety of settings that include labor-management
negotiations, international relations, community disputes, school conflicts, and legal disputes,
among others (see Wall et aI., 2001, for a review). In the U.S., fonnal mediation plays a
prominent role in labor contract disputes, court-mandated pre-trial mediation, and it is becoming
increasingly used to resolve community disputes. The stakes of mediation range from relatively
small (e.g., grievance mediation of employment disputes) to enonnous (e.g., U.S. mediation
efforts between Israel and Palestine).
Given the importance of mediation it is somewhat surprising that economic research has
done little to analyze the process and outcomes of mediation. This is likely due to the prevailing
notion that mediation is a fonn of "art" and, since successful mediators "orchestrate" settlements,
the process is not well suited for systematic analysis. This article highlights how economic
analysis can bring something to bear on our understanding of mediation by recognizing that a
mediator is essentially the Walrasian auctioneer of exchange theory. Negotiators who bargain
over the allocation of two or more issues are analogous to participants in an exchange economy,
and mediators attempt to generate a Pareto efficient equilibrium. This is a simple yet powerful
insight: the basic task of mediators is to vary the relative price of bargaining issues in order to
induce voluntary agreement among netotiators.

lThis paper has benefited from conversations with John Gilbert and Ronda Callister.
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Though the skill required of a successful mediator is not to be ignored, I believe it is quite
useful to draw attention to the core task at hand-"calling out" the correct relative price. 1 The
implications of this approach to viewing dispute resolution may open the door to a more
systematic way of analyzing mediation and other ADR procedures.

2.

Negotiations and Dispute as an Exchange Economy
Assume bilateral negotiations between bargainers, a and b, over two issues,

X1

and X2. 2

This is the simplest case that allows for "trade-offs" between issues, although the analysis
extends easily to the n-issue case (as well as the m-bargainer case). Assume well-behaved
preferences such that U/(Xi»O and ~"(Xi)<O forj=a,b, i=1,2. Now consider an Edgeworth
"Bargaining" Box. Assume some initial endowment that may be the outcome of previous
negotiations in repeated bargaining or long-term relationships. An example of two items in a
typical labor-management dispute would be profits (or excess profits) and job security of
employees. Management would then have preferences that are increasing in both the amount of
its profits retained and in workforce flexibility (e.g., the opposite of job security to the workers).
The dimensions of the Edgeworth Box may be determined by physical limitations (e.g., profits),
legislated limitations (e.g., work hours limitations), or also by a previous stage of negotiations.
A common characteristic of negotiations is making trade-offs, which is reflected in the
relative price (or trade-off rate) of negotiation issues. Figure 1 shows the case of dispute over

bargaining issue # 1 due to an incorrect relative price. The key point to be made is that any
dispute can be viewed as a situation of excess demand for at least one bargaining issue. A
bargaining dispute is thus a special case of general disequilibrium in an exchange economy.

1 The ability to highlight the key item to successful mediation is also important as a growing number of communitybased mediation programs utilize community volunteers who, though trained to some extent, may respond better to a
simple description of how to accomplish their objectives.
2 This section draws upon insights in Raiffa (1982).
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At this point, simple general equilibrium theory introduces the mythical Walrasian
auctioneer who calls out prices and adjusts them appropriately to generate general equilibrium.
Note that this is precisely the role that the mediator plays in facilitating an agreement among
negotiators. The mediator facilitates a process of "tatonnement" (curiously but typically
translated as "groping") described in the classic work ofWalras (1926), whereby proposed tradeoffs between negotiated items go back and forth until there is equilibrium in the system of
equations of negotiated items. A mediator has no authority (generally) to impose a binding
settlement, and so the key tool at his disposal is the ability to change the trade-off rate of Xl for
X2.

3

Specifically, since Figure 1 shows a case of excess demand for issue #1 (e.g. profits, which

would be evidenced by a firm's wage offer<union' s wage demand), the mediator must "increase"
the price of issue # 1 relative to issue #2. By doing so to the correct extent the negotiators would

voluntarily settle-that is, achieve general equilibrium in the bargaining economy. This clearly
simplifies the job of a mediator, but the point is that the many tactics that mediators use have the
basic objective of altering the negotiators' trade-off rate to achieve "agreement" equilibrium. 4
Of course, difficulties in the task of the mediator should be highlighted. First, the larger
the change needed in the relative price, the more difficult is the job of the mediator. One would
hypothesize mediation's failure rate and/or the time required to mediate a dispute are increasing
in the distance between positions on an issue (i.e., the extent of the excess demand), ceteris
paribus. Wall et al. (2001) offers some evidence in support of this hypothesis in noting that
higher settlement rates are found in mediations of elementary school student disputes versus
difficult international disputes. This is consistent with the assumption that excess demand of key

3 Some mediators even avoid making explicit (nonbinding) suggestions for outcomes, though this is not always the
case (Wall et aI., 2001).
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issues is greater in international disputes or that it is more difficult to alter the negotiators' tradeoff rate between issues in international disputes. Secondly, negotiations might be over a
multitude of issues. The existence of multiple options for swapping/trading issues, though
apparently adding complexity, may ironically be advantageous to the skilled mediator who can
affect trade-off rates by highlighting creative trades among multiple issues. Finally, dispute
might also occur over what the initial endowment is. In this case, mediators must first align
beliefs of what the starting point is before moving forward in mediation. For example, complex
international negotiations often utilize a "single-negotiations text" (SNT)-an initial proposal by
mediators-as a starting point for negotiations (see Raiffa, 1982).
There is evidence in support of the notion that mediators work towards changing the
trade-off rate of issues on the bargaining table. In a recent survey of the literature on mediation
Wall et al. (2001) notes a large variety of tactics that mediators might employ. Among those of
interest here: information provision, pressure tactics, threats, and even monetary compensation.
Some of these tactics are specific to the culture in which mediation occurs, but all may be used to
alter trade-off rates of bargaining issues. In the U.S. mediation efforts of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, the U.S. has contributed much of its own resources to "sweeten the deal" and attempt to
alter the trade-offs of key bargaining issues (i.e., land and security). Greig (2001) also notes the
importance of using outside resources for mediation success in international dispute resolution,
and such explicit attempts to alter trade-off rates of bargaining issues are not uncommon. 5

3.

Implications

It is worth noting the difference between Pareto efficiency and dispute. Mediators seek to have bargainers exhaust
all mutually beneficial gains from trade-offs in negotiations. At any given outcome, however, bargainers still prefer
more to less and may still find reason to dispute the outcome in some sense.
s Raiffa (1982) gives the example of the Camp David negotiations between Israel and Egypt where a SNT was used
along with U.S. mediation pressure and sweeteners for achieving agreements.
4
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By analyzing negotiations as an exchange economy and mediators as Walrasian
auctioneers, there are at least two implications worth noting.
IMPLICATION 1: Successful mediation leads negotiators to a Pareto efficient
agreement.
This follows from our assumption that the mediator's basic task is to call out the correct relative
price. This restatement of the first welfare theorem is quite a forceful endorsement of mediation.
F or a given initial allocation of issues (and well-behaved preferences, etc.), there is precisely one
relative price that will generate general equilibrium, and this equilibrium will be on the contract
curve of Pareto efficient outcomes. Note that this result does not depend on the mediator having
complete information on the negotiators' preferences. Mediators must simply alter trade-off
rates in response to revealed excess demand for bargaining items.
IMPLICATION 2: Mediators can guide negotiators towards desired outcomes when
outside resources are utilized.
This second implication is quite interesting in that it suggests that mediators might exploit the
fact that they may prefer some outcomes over others . Of course, this suggests a non-neutral
mediator, but in certain mediation efforts the choice to involve an outsider with a stake in the
outcomes is seen as necessary, especially in international mediation. Whether guided by selfinterest, or by notions of distribute justice, fairness, etc., a mediator who can alter the dimensions
of the bargaining box can exercise some discretion over negotiated outcomes. This follows from
the fact that the contract curve moves with an increase in the amount of either bargaining issue
(assuming that at least certain bargaining items are purchasable with mediator currency).6 This
may help explain behavior in international mediation where stakeholders mediate while often
adding their own resources to help guide outcomes in a particular way.
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Though the "correct" relative price will guarantee a Pareto efficient agreement, mediation
might still be considered successful by other criteria. One might argue that any voluntary
settlement indicates successful mediation because "voluntary" implies a Pareto improvement for
both negotiators. However, a non Pareto efficient agreement does not realize all possible
bargaining gains, and such agreements may plant seeds for future dispute. Some may even argue
that if disputants are brought closer to agreement, then this implies a measure of success of the
mediation process, though clearly less so than when a voluntary settlement is procured. At the
very least, failed mediation maintains the status quo allocation, which is (weakly) part of the
Pareto set. The apparent popularity of mediation is more easily understood when one considers
that, by virtue of being a nonbinding procedure, negotiators will never be made worse off.
4.

Conclusions
As with any theoretical analysis, simplifying assumptions must be made. This analysis of

mediation assumes that negotiators do not gain any utility directly from mediation, but evidence
suggests that negotiators may gain satisfaction from the process itself (Depner et aI., 1994).
Similarly, mediation might generate a positive externality. For example, Kitzmann and Emery
(1994) argue that children are shielded from hostility in custody mediation, and gang mediation
provides middle-school students with safer schools (Tabish and Orell, 1996). If positive
externalities are generated then mediation will be relatively underutilized compared to what
would be socially efficient. Relaxing some of these simplifying assumptions highlights areas
that are ripe for further systematic analysis of mediation.
In this article I consider a simple negotiations case that may not seem to capture the

flavor of real world negotiations and/or mediation. This criticism, however, would equally apply
to general equilibrium theory as a whole. In the end, there is a powerful message to convey in

6

This point is made in a trade context with factor endowments by Rybczynski (1955).
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noting that the complexities of mediation can be simplified to a basic task of altering relative
prices to promote general equilibrium. This is the job of the Walrasian auctioneer as economists
know it. Once mediation is cast in the light of an exchange economy, economic analysis can
bring much more to bear on this widely-used, but under-analyzed, ADR procedure.
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Mediation is a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that uses a neutral third-party
to help resolve disputes, but mediators generally do not make binding decisions. As such,
mediators are effective only in as much as they can facilitate a voluntary settlement among the
disputants. This contrasts with arbitrators, for example, who dictate binding settlements.
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Given the importance of mediation it is somewhat surprising that economic research has
done little to analyze the process and outcomes of mediation. This is likely due to the prevailing
notion that mediation is a form of "art" and, since successful mediators "orchestrate" settlements,
the process is not well suited for systematic analysis. This article highlights how economic
analysis can bring something to bear on our understanding of mediation by recognizing that a
mediator is essentially the Walrasian auctioneer of exchange theory. Negotiators who bargain
over the allocation of two or more issues are analogous to participants in an exchange economy,
and mediators attempt to generate a Pareto efficient equilibrium. This is a simple yet powerful
insight: the basic task of mediators is to vary the relative price of bargaining issues in order to
induce voluntary agreement among negotiators.
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